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Two divergent lines of cases emerged in the Federal Circuit in the wake of 
Markman v. Westview Instruments1 on the proper methodology to use for defining 
disputed terms of patent claims.  Many of these opinions purported to be consistent with 
Federal Circuit precedent, yet obvious inconsistencies appeared, causing much 
uncertainty for patent litigators and prosecutors.  The dispute focused on whether a trial 
court should primarily consider intrinsic evidence – the claims, the specification, and the 
prosecution history – or extrinsic evidence – mainly general use and technical 
dictionaries and treatises – to properly construe terms found in patent claims.  
On July 21, 2004, the Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc in Phillips v. 
AWH Corp.2 in part to resolve this claim construction conflict.  Ultimately, the court 
issued a new opinion on July 12, 2005, that held that intrinsic evidence must be the 
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2primary source for construing patent claims.  The court further reasoned that while 
extrinsic evidence may be consulted to assist the court in understanding a particular 
technology, it must be afforded its appropriate weight – subordinate to all of the intrinsic 
evidence.  Although the Federal Circuit in Phillips provided practitioners guidance on 
which to base future claim construction attempts, it admittedly constructed a loose 
framework designed to be applied on a case-by- case basis.
After Phillips, claim construction jurisprudence remains in disarray as the Federal 
Circuit appears to be applying different parts of its Phillips ruling in different cases.  The 
effects of the holding in this case will not be totally clear for some time, as evidenced by 
the convoluted holdings being handed down post-Phillips.  To be successful under the 
current case law, patent litigators must master a comprehensive understanding of Phillips
and keep abreast of pending decisions applying Phillips.  Furthermore, patent prosecutors 
must write precise specifications, focusing on the consistent use of terms between the 
claims and the remainder of the specification.  Although the court may have disappointed 
many observers when it refused to provide clear guidelines for claim construction in 
Phillips, the case’s legacy will be defined more by what it failed to say rather than by its 
3explicit holdings.  The days of the dictionary presumption are over, but where claim 
construction goes from there remains unclear.
I. Phillips I – A Bird that Didn’t Fly 
 In its order granting rehearing en banc in the initial Phillips case, the Federal 
Circuit vacated its previous judgment entered April 8, 20043 and withdrew the opinion of 
the first panel that affirmed the grant of summary judgment after a claim construction 
hearing.4  In the Federal Circuit’s order, the majority invited the parties to file additional 
briefing and any other interested parties to file amicus curiae briefs on seven questions.5
Many of the court’s questions focused on the proper weight to assign to different types of 
evidence used in claim construction.6
 In the en banc Phillips case, the majority held that intrinsic evidence consisting of 
the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history must be given 
greatest weight in claim construction.7  Further, the majority stated that dictionaries and 
other extrinsic evidence may be consulted to assist the court in understanding a particular 
technology.8  The court settled upon loosely structured claim construction rules, focusing 
4mainly upon affording each type of evidence its appropriate weight.9  The majority 
expressly reaffirmed its decision in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.10, which held 
that intrinsic evidence is to be consulted first to construe the claims and that extrinsic 
evidence is to be used only if the intrinsic evidence fails to provide an adequate definition 
of a claim term or merely to assist the court in understanding the technology in 
question.11
 The en banc court openly criticized the claim construction methodology presented 
in Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.12  The court explained that “the methodology 
[Texas Digital] adopted placed too much reliance on extrinsic sources such as 
dictionaries…and too little on intrinsic sources.”13 The court acknowledged that looking 
to intrinsic evidence first may lead a court to mistakenly read limitations from the 
specification into the claims, but expressed confidence in the district courts to properly 
perform that task.14
 The facts of Phillips allowed the issue of the proper methodology to use for claim 
construction to be squarely presented.  Edward H. Phillips invented vandalism-resistant 
panels that may be welded together to form walls capable of fire and noise insulation.15
5After obtaining a patent on the invention, Mr. Phillips disclosed his invention to AWH 
Corporation, Hopeman Brothers, Inc. and Lofton Corporation (collectively hereinafter  
“AWH”) and agreed to allow AWH to make and sell the products.16  This agreement 
ended in 1990.17  In 1991, Mr. Phillips came across AWH advertising indicating that 
AWH continued to make and sell his invention without his consent.18  After failed 
negotiations, Mr. Phillips filed suit against AWH in 1997 alleging in pertinent part that 
AWH infringed his patent.19  After determining that the claims at issue contained 
“means-plus-function” language, the trial court considered the disclosures in the 
specification that corresponded to the “structure, material, or acts” as required under 35 
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.20  The trial court concluded that the specification failed to disclose 
baffles found within the wall that were placed at a 90° angle.21  Moreover, the 
specification referred to baffles placed at any angle other than 90°.22  Upon ruling that the 
scope of the claims at issue failed to include baffles placed at a 90° angle, the trial court 
granted AWH’s motion for summary judgment.23
II. Claim Construction Before Phillips – Clear as Mud
6Before Phillips was redecided in July of 2005, two distinct claim construction 
methodologies had evolved24: the so-called “dictionary disciples”25 and those abiding by 
the “specification über alles” rule.26  The “dictionary disciples” support defining claim 
terms primarily by referencing a dictionary, as long as the dictionary definition is not 
inconsistent with the specification.27  In contrast, those advocating the “specification über 
alles” rule maintain that the trial court must first consult the intrinsic evidence of a patent.   
Only upon failure to find a definition from the intrinsic evidence, may the court consider 
extrinsic evidence to help define a claim term.28  Many Federal Circuit cases construed 
claims by one methodology or the other.  And while such opinions expressly 
acknowledged the conflict between the two, they failed to definitively resolve the 
conflict, thereby leaving the door open for a different panel to further tweak the already-
murky rule.
For example, in Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni29, the Federal 
Circuit recognized two classic claim construction canons, “(a) one may not read a 
limitation into a claim from the written description, but (b) one may look to the written 
description to define a term already in a claim limitation.”  The Renishaw court heralded 
7these canons as being “at the core of claim construction methodology…provid[ing] 
guideposts for a spectrum of claim construction problems.”30  The court quoted with 
approval from a 1958 CCPA case that “indiscriminate reliance on definitions found in 
dictionaries can often produce absurd results,” and further stated that “where there are 
several common meanings for a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to point away 
from the improper meanings and toward the proper meaning.”31  Similarly, in 
Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc.32, the Federal Circuit held that 
“extrinsic evidence…is useful insofar as it ‘can shed useful light on the relevant art – and 
thus better allow a court to place itself in the shoes of a person of ordinary skill in the art’ 
reading the claims alongside the rest of the specification.”33  The Astrazeneca court 
acknowledged that some of the Federal Circuit’s recent cases “suggest[ed] that the 
intrinsic record…should be consulted only after the ordinary and customary meaning of 
claim terms…is determined” and cited a “presumption in favor of a dictionary 
definition.”34 (emphasis added). 
Other cases leaned more directly toward one methodology over the other.  In 
8V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SPA35, the Federal Circuit held that the “intrinsic 
record…is [the] primary tool to supply context for interpretation of disputed claim 
terms…to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.”  On the other hand, 
in Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc.36, the court held that “dictionaries are often 
helpful in ascertaining the plain and ordinary meaning of claim language.”
In 2002, the Federal Circuit decided Texas Digital, which attracted much attention 
and established itself as the seminal case for the “dictionary disciples.”37  The court stated 
that the terms of a claim “bear a ‘heavy presumption’” that the definition intended in the 
claim is consistent with the ordinary meaning to a skilled person in the art and the trial 
court should give a claim term such a meaning unless the presumption is properly 
rebutted, regardless of whether the dictionary definitions have been offered into 
evidence.38  The court acknowledged that dictionaries may be one of “the most 
meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding…the 
technology.”39  The court further reasoned that the intrinsic evidence relating to the patent 
should be examined, but only to determine whether it rebuts the presumption in favor of 
the dictionary meaning.40  The court concluded that a dictionary definition may only be 
9rebutted where intrinsic evidence clearly uses words that are inconsistent with the 
ordinary meaning of the claim term found by consulting a dictionary.41
Roughly two years after Texas Digital, the Federal Circuit again changed its spots 
when it decided C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.42, which held that “extrinsic 
evidence cannot alter any claim meaning discernible from intrinsic evidence.”  The court 
credited a long line of precedent indicating that “the intrinsic record is the primary source 
for determining claim meaning.”43  In criticizing the plaintiff’s argument that Texas 
Digital “held” that dictionaries should primarily be consulted when construing claim 
terms, the court stated that the Texas Digital court merely “advised” that such a method 
would be preferred.44  However, this court also failed to clearly state the basis upon 
which C.R. Bard was decided and can possibly be considered dicta itself.  Rather 
interestingly, the C.R. Bard court noted that the claim construction issue might soon be 
resolved by the grant of an en banc rehearing in the Phillips case.45
Many practitioners conclude that the lack of consistency from the Federal Circuit 
on claim construction methodology pre-Phillips was a function of the ever-changing 
panels of judges assigned to a particular case.46  As a result of the obvious disagreement 
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over the proper method to interpret claim terms by members of the Federal Circuit, many 
observers anxiously awaited claim construction guidance from Phillips that might yield 
some certainty.47  Some even heralded Phillips as the most important patent case of the 
decade.48
III. Has the Federal Circuit Merely Rearranged the Furniture?
 The consequences of Phillips were anticipated to be grand, yet they failed to meet 
the expectations of those who hoped for a monumental change in claim construction 
jurisprudence.49  Rather, Phillips signified a departure from the “experiment”50 the 
Federal Circuit was conducting that was marked by its decision in Texas Digital.51  Since 
Phillips, the Federal Circuit has revisited claim construction issues several times, 
resulting in varying outcomes.  In Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc.52, decided only two months 
after the Phillips decision, the Federal Circuit granted rehearing for “the limited purpose 
of addressing the effects of Phillips.”  Only two days after Nystrom, the Federal Circuit 
again tested its holding in Phillips in Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Intern., Inc.53
This time the court incorporated a dictionary definition into the claim construction 
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analysis while claiming to follow the Phillips rule merely by stating that the specification 
comported with the dictionary’s definition of the disputed claim term.  Ultimately, claim 
construction methodology remains uncertain and unresolved post-Phillips.
A. Is Phillips Making a Name for Itself?
The Federal Circuit granted rehearing in Nystrom as a result of its holding in 
Phillips.54  The court withdrew its pre-Phillips opinion in Nystrom and affirmed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement.55  In its withdrawn 2004 
opinion, the Nystrom court claimed that the district court “erroneously construed certain 
claim limitations” when it defined the terms at issue by following the Texas Digital 
methodology.56  The court reasoned that in the absence of a clear definition or disavowal 
of a meaning in the disclosure, a term must be interpreted from the perspective of a 
person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the filing of the application.57  The 
perspective of the ordinary skilled artisan may be found by “reviewing a variety of 
sources, including the claims themselves; dictionaries and treatises; and the written 
description, drawings, and prosecution history.”58 (emphasis added).  These statements 
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imply that dictionaries are higher in priority than the specification for purposes of claim 
construction.59
Upon reconsideration of Nystrom post-Phillips, the Federal Circuit reversed its 
claim construction ruling, holding that a claim term must be interpreted in “light of the 
entire intrinsic record.”60  The court further noted that the “construction that stays true to 
the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the 
invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.”61  However, the court also noted 
that “resort to dictionaries may be helpful.”62  The court stated that “[w]hat Phillips now 
counsels is that in the absence of something in the written description or the prosecution 
history…that the inventor intended a disputed term to cover more than the ordinary and 
customary meaning revealed…[in] the intrinsic records, it is improper to read the term to 
encompass a broader definition simply because it may be found in a dictionary, treatise, 
or other extrinsic source.”63  In lieu of further explanation of Phillips, the court in 
Nystrom merely applied the principles already established in Phillips and reiterated its 
policies.64
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After Nystrom appeared to reaffirm Phillips, the Federal Circuit decided Free 
Motion Fitness in which the court construed the definition of the word “adjacent” by 
relying heavily on a dictionary definition.  The court began by announcing its adherence 
to the claim construction methodology presented in Phillips, yet concluded without 
explanation that the term “adjacent” was not defined in the intrinsic evidence or the 
relevant art and so resorted to a dictionary.65  The court focused its Phillips-based
analysis on the freedom to incorporate dictionary definitions into claim construction and 
even pointed out that a court may afford a term the full breadth of its ordinary meaning, 
while presumptively receiving “its broadest dictionary definition or the aggregate of 
multiple dictionary definitions.”66  The court settled on the meaning of “adjacent” to be 
“not distant.”67  In reaching this construction, the court merely referred to the 
specification to make sure the dictionary definition did not contradict the one found in the 
specification.68  While the Free Motion Fitness court mentioned the Phillips
methodology, it did not actually apply that methodology.  69
Since Phillips, the Federal Circuit appears to have selected portions of the Phillips
claim construction methodology to conduct its analysis.  On occasion, the court 
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emphasizes that “the specification necessarily informs the proper construction of the 
claims” and that it is “appropriate for the court…to rely heavily on the written description 
for guidance as to the meaning of claims.”70 (emphasis added).  It has even criticized 
parties for failing to rely upon definitions that may be found within the intrinsic 
evidence.71  In other instances, the court has held that dictionaries may be used to help 
define claim terms if given proper weight, but that intrinsic evidence is of “central 
importance” and therefore must be consulted first.72  On the other hand, the Federal 
Circuit has criticized a trial court for improperly importing limitations from the 
specification into the claims, thereby restricting the claims’ scope to coverage of a single 
embodiment.73  In early January of 2006, the majority opinion in nCube Corp v. 
Seachange Intern., Inc.74 did not even cite Phillips.  The dissent noted that fact and itself 
relied on Phillips to support the dissenting opinion, quoting from Phillips “the 
specification is always highly relevant to…claim construction…[and is] usually 
dispositive.”75
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B. The Bottom Line
 At this point, practitioners may be wondering what practical information may be 
extracted from Phillips and its progeny of a handful of cases.  The Phillips majority 
opinion failed to completely clarify claim construction methodology and claim 
construction still appears to be approached by the court on a case-by- case basis.76  The 
specification remains crucial and must be carefully written because it apparently will be 
the focus of any claim construction.  One thing that is clear is that the previous 
presumption in favor of dictionary definitions has been jettisoned.  Therefore  
practitioners should carefully use terms consistently in the specification and claims.
 Ideally, patent prosecutors would properly anticipate the points of novelty in the 
invention before filing so that they may properly define claim terms as intended in the 
specification.  Prosecutors may wish to consider referring to technical or general use 
dictionaries when choosing language to describe elements of the invention.  Additionally, 
use of such phrases as “the present invention” or “the preferred embodiment” in the 
application might best be replaced by “an embodiment,” which is likely to be deemed 
less restrictive in the context of a litigation.  Many prosecutors may cringe at the thought 
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of providing explicit definitions of claim terms because they wish to provide litigators 
with some flexibility for interpretation of the terms in the future.
 Claim construction jurisprudence continues to “percolate,” although recent panel 
decisions post-Phillips do seem to have fewer dissenting opinions.  In patents today, it is 
crucial that both prosecutors and litigators have a comprehensive working knowledge of 
Phillips and its progeny.  Definitions of claim terms advocated by trial attorneys ideally 
will be a nicely meshed hybrid of the definition ascertainable from intrinsic evidence and 
that gleaned from extrinsic evidence such as a dictionary.  And the trial attorney’s job can 
be made much easier if the patent drafter puts careful thought into crafting a patent 
application that applies the Phillips and post-Phillips principles.   
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